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Abstract  
 
In this study, we analyse the degree of polarisation—a concept fundamentally 
different from that of inequality—in the international distribution of CO2 
emissions per capita in the European Union. It is analytically relevant to 
examine the degree of instability inherent to a distribution and, in the analysed 
case, the likelihood that the distribution and its evolution will increase or 
decrease the chances of reaching an agreement. Two approaches were used to 
measure polarisation: the endogenous approach, in which countries are 
grouped according to their similarity in terms of emissions, and the exogenous 
approach, in which countries are grouped geographically. Our findings indicate 
a clear decrease in polarisation since the mid-1990s, which can essentially be 
explained by the fact that the different groups of countries have converged (i.e. 
antagonism among the CO2 emitters has decreased) as the contribution of 
energy intensity to between-group differences has decreased. This lower 
degree of polarisation in CO2 distribution suggests a situation more conducive 
to the possibility of reaching EU-wide agreements on the mitigation of CO2 
emissions. 
Key words: CO2 emissions, distribution of emissions, European Union, 
mitigation agreements, polarisation. 
1. Introduction 
 
 
The concept of polarisation is associated with the degree to which the 
distribution of a given variable tends to cluster around homogeneous poles 
which are distant from one another. A distribution is highly polarised when there 
are few poles, each large in size, and a high degree of antagonism between 
them. Interest in this phenomenon, and in measuring it, is due to its link to the 
potential for conflict. Moreover, as demonstrated by Esteban and Ray (1994), 
this concept is also fundamentally different from that of inequality (Cowell, 
1995).  
 
Because polarisation is associated with the potential for conflict, it is an 
especially relevant concept for the analysis of scenarios in which agents must 
negotiate and reach agreements. This is the case for the agreements on how to 
distribute, among the various European Union countries, the necessary efforts 
to reduce CO2 emissions in order to meet the mitigation objectives assumed by 
the EU as a political unit. Specifically, it would seem reasonable to assume that, 
all other factors being equal, greater polarisation of the distribution of CO2 
emissions among European Union countries would mean less cohesion around 
effort-sharing proposals to address the problem and greater difficulty in 
reaching agreements.  
 
The European Union has taken on greater commitments in the struggle against 
climate change than any other political community to date. In March 2007, the 
European Council committed to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions by at least 
20% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020, with the option of raising the target to 
30% if the other high-income countries agreed to a comparable objective. 
Nevertheless, there is great inequality among the various EU countries in terms 
of emissions per capita, the ambition to meet the set goals, and stances with 
regard to the criteria applied in the distribution of efforts. The emission-reduction 
efforts required of the various member states in order to meet the 2020 target 
were not established until April 2009 (Decision no. 406/2009/EC of the 
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European Parliament and of the Council). The effort-sharing discussions were 
complicated, and conflicts arose between the objectives of various groups of 
countries (as, for example, at the European summit of October 2008 in 
Brussels, where a group of eight Eastern European countries called into 
question whether the previously agreed objectives should be maintained).1 
Similar processes of negotiation and conflict had already occurred in the Kyoto 
discussions among the then 15 EU member states leading up to the adoption of 
the 8% reduction target. Today, due to the larger number of member states and 
the diverse range of situations they bring to the table, as well as the need to 
reach increasingly ambitious goals in the future, it is more important than ever 
to analyse the various factors that can increase or decrease the likelihood of 
reaching agreements at the EU level.  
 
Given the potential relevance of the subject, it seems worthwhile to conduct a 
quantitative assessment of the evolution of the polarisation of emissions of the 
various European Union countries. The literature describes two major 
approaches to measuring polarisation. The first of these is the endogenous 
approach, in which groups (of countries, in our case) are formed on the basis of 
similarities, using mechanisms aimed at minimising intra-group differences. The 
polarisation indices developed by Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. 
(2007) for multiple-pole cases and by Wolfson (1994, 1997) and Wang and Tsui 
(2000) for the specific bipolar case are commonly cited examples of this 
approach. The second is the exogenous approach, comprising methods in 
which groups are determined ex-ante, for instance on the basis of geographical 
criteria. One example is the method proposed by Zhang and Kanbur (2001), 
which is based on inequality decomposition by population subgroups 
(Shorrocks, 1984).  
 
This concept has only previously been applied to the analysis of environmental 
distribution by Duro and Padilla (2008), in a study analysing polarisation in the 
international distribution of CO2 emissions using the indices proposed by 
                                                 
1 Specifically, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, with Italy later joining the 
group. The governments of these countries questioned whether the goals should be so ambitious and rejected the 
adoption of measures that did not adequately respect the various countries’ differences in terms of economic potential.  
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Esteban et al. (2007), and by Duro (2010), in a paper analysing international 
polarisation by means of the exogenous approach, which also made it possible 
to carry out a factor decomposition analysis. In the present study, we carry out 
the first polarisation analysis of the European Union—a 27-country political unit 
that has jointly adopted mitigation objectives—using both the exogenous and 
endogenous approaches, with a view to gaining a more complete understanding 
of the situation. Specifically, we analyse the polarisation of CO2 emissions per 
capita in the European Union from 1990 to 2007.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the main 
methodological aspects associated with the measurement and decomposition of 
polarisation. In Section 3, we provide empirical evidence derived from the 
application of polarisation measures to the case of CO2 emissions in European 
Union countries from 1990 to 2007. Finally, in Section 4, we present our main 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. Methodological aspects 
 
 
Non-parametric techniques for analysing the shape and dynamics of a 
distribution—in other words, density function estimation—are unable to obtain 
precise quantitative information about changes in polarisation over time 
(Ezcurra, 2007). We must therefore explore the various alternatives that have 
been proposed in the literature, which can be grouped in two major categories. 
The first category comprises methods in which groups are formed optimally, 
with the aim of minimising within-group heterogeneity. This category includes 
the ER indices, proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994), and the EGR indices, 
proposed by Esteban et al. (2007), both designed for general cases of 
polarisation, as well as the measures proposed by Wolfson (1994, 1997) and by 
Wang and Tsui (2000), designed specifically for the bipolar case. The second 
category includes the Z-K index, proposed by Zhang and Kanbur (2001).  
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All methods for measuring polarisation, regardless of category, satisfy two basic 
properties. First, the measured polarisation increases as within-group inequality 
decreases; in other words, greater internal cohesion strengthens group 
identification and therefore increases the potential for conflict (“identification 
effect”). Second, the measured polarisation increases as the distance 
(antagonism) between the groups increases (“alienation effect”).  
 
With the notation adapted to the analysis of CO2 emissions, the EGR indices 
would formally be defined as:  
 
EGR ,  pi1
j1
n
i1
n p j eie  e je   G  Gs    (1) 
where pi and pj are the relative populations of countries i and j; ei and ej are the 
CO2 emissions per capita of countries i and j; e is the worldwide average;  is 
the parameter that measures the sensitivity of the measure to polarisation, the 
value of which falls between 1 and 1.6;  is a parameter showing the 
measure’s sensitivity to the groups’ level of cohesion; G is the Gini coefficient of 
the original distribution; and Gs is the Gini coefficient of the grouped distribution 
(between-group inequality). The higher the value of , the greater the 
conceptual difference between EGR and the Gini coefficient.  
 
The measure comprises two addends. The first addend corresponds to the ER 
index, which is axiomatically derived using a behavioural model (Esteban and 
Ray, 1994). The second addend takes into account the error committed when 
the observations are grouped and the distribution is simplified by poles, thereby 
incorporating a statistical approach into the measurement of polarisation. 
Specifically, this second addend is equal to the difference between the overall 
inequality and the between-group inequality, and therefore provides an intuitive 
estimate of the degree of within-group inequality. The parameter β weights this 
error component ( = G – Gs) in the general value of the measure. Thus, 
following Duro (2005), it would be reasonable to set  at a value of 1, mainly 
because the EGR and Gini values are similar.  
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Before the aforementioned formula can be applied, we must define the cut-off 
points between the groups (which are exhaustive and mutually exclusive), thus 
obtaining the simplified representation of the original distribution. As an 
example, one reasonable option would be to establish these boundaries 
following the method proposed by Davies and Shorrocks (1989), in which the 
cut-off point between groups is defined by the average weighted emission 
(income in the original formulation) of the two adjacent groups.  
 
The EGR measures seem, for various reasons, to be preferable to those 
proposed by Wolfson (1994, 1997) and Wang and Tsui (2000). First, they are 
theoretically derived from the establishment of conflict models. Second, they 
can be applied not only to the examination of bipolarisation, but also to the 
analysis of polarisation generally.  
 
It may also be of interest to analyse the degree of polarisation when groups are 
determined ex-ante according to some reasonable criterion, such as 
geographical location. Zhang and Kanbur (2001) suggested a polarisation 
measure based on the inequality decomposition by groups (Shorrocks, 1980, 
1984). One advantage of this measure is that it easily accommodates various 
decomposition formats. Specifically, the degree of polarisation of a distribution 
could be expressed as:  
    
w
b
T
TKZ         (2) 
 
where 
 





G
1g g
gb e
eln*pT  and  


G
1g
g*gw TpT
 
where g denotes a group, eg is the average emissions per capita for group g, 
and Tg is the internal inequality of group g.  
 
Notice that the numerator reflects the magnitude of the heterogeneity between 
the groups, like the alienation effect in the EGR approach, while the 
denominator reflects the magnitude of the internal heterogeneities, like the 
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identification effect. Thus, growth in the between-groups component (i.e. groups 
becoming more antagonistic) consistently tends to increase the value of the 
measurement, whereas an increase in internal heterogeneity (i.e. less 
identification) tends to reduce its value.  
 
This measure also behaves differently from conventional inequality measures 
such as the Theil index (see Cowell, 1995). Specifically, the discrepancy is 
associated with the different role attributed to intra-group inequality. There is a 
positive relationship between intra-group inequality and the global inequality 
approach, but it turns negative depending on the polarisation approach. For 
practical purposes, then, a significant variation of the within-group component 
could lead to inconsistent patterns between inequality measures and the Z-K 
measure.2  
 
An essential aspect, for analytical purposes, is that the between-group 
inequality component can in turn be decomposed by multiplicative factors, as 
with the Kaya identity (1989), according to the methodology proposed by Duro 
and Padilla (2006), and the same procedure can also be performed in the 
within-groups component, given that it is simply a weighted average of the 
inequality indices. Therefore, as Duro (2010) noted, we can evaluate the 
sources of change in the value of the Z-K index by decomposing its group 
components.  
 
 
3. Empirical evidence 
 
3.1. Endogeneous groups 
 
Let us begin by analysing the changes in CO2 emissions per capita in the 
European Union between 1990 and 2007. The data—which, like the other data 
cited below, were provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2010a)—
refer to metric tons of CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion. Emissions per 
                                                 
2 Analyses of international distribution of emissions that use the inequality approach include Heil and Wodon (1997), 
Hedenus and Azar (2005), Padilla and Serrano (2006) and Duro and Padilla (2006). 
 7
inhabitant of the European Union dropped by 7.8% over the course of the study 
period. The emissions dropped most sharply between 1990 and 1994 and, 
despite fluctuations, the trend since 1994 has been towards stabilisation at 
around 8 metric tons. Changes in emissions per capita from 1990 to 2007 were 
more positive in the European Union than in the world as a whole, with the latter 
registering a 10% increase during the same period.3 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of CO2 emissions per capita in the European Union, 
1990–2007 
8.58 tn p.c.
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Note: 1990 = 100 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
 
Let us now analyse the evolution of the polarisation that has accompanied 
these changes in emissions in the European Union. If, for example, the overall 
reduction in emissions per capita had coincided with an increase in polarisation, 
then tensions could be expected to arise among the countries, against the 
backdrop of the need to reach mitigation agreements.  
 
First, we computed the values of the EGR family of indices (generalised 
polarisation measure) for the international distribution of CO2 emissions per 
capita between 1990 and 2007. In order to test the robustness of the 
                                                 
3 Nevertheless, it should be noted that per capita emissions in the European Union were 80% higher than the world 
average in 2007. 
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calculations, we considered three different values for the parameter  for the 
cases of two, three and four groups, respectively—the cases that, according to 
the literature, seemed most reasonable. The value of  was set at 1, as in 
Esteban et al. (2007). Appendix 1 shows the composition of the groups of 
countries obtained endogenously by means of an optimisation procedure.  
 
The results indicate, first of all, a certain stability of values towards the mid-
1990s, and a considerable non-monotonic decrease since then (Tables 1, 3 and 
5). This pattern holds regardless of the parameterisation used for  and the 
number of groups. For example, the two-group EGR decreases by 38% when  
= 1, by 42% when  = 1.3, and by 49% when  = 1.6; the three-group EGR 
decreases by 27%, 31% and 35%; and the four-group EGR decreases by 22%, 
23% and 25%, respectively.4  
 
Let us now consider the role of changes in relative weights and relative 
emissions in determining the evolution of the ER component. In the bipolar case 
(Table 2), we can clearly discern the role of the lower degree of alienation, 
given that the groups of countries with the lowest and highest levels of relative 
emissions are both close to the mean. In the three-group case (Table 4) we see 
a similar effect, with the middle and high groups approaching the mean, but also 
a weighting effect due to the increased size of the middle group.  
 
An analysis of the error term () reveals that variations in this term over time 
have a limited impact on reducing the aforementioned polarisation. In the 
bipolar and four-group cases, the value of the error in 2007 is very similar to 
that obtained in 1990. In the three-group case, variations in the error term are 
somewhat greater, but their contribution to the decrease in polarisation is 
significantly smaller than the contribution of changes in the aforementioned 
relative weights and relative emissions. Thus, in global terms, the generalised 
evolution of polarisation can be attributed to the simplified polarisation 
component. 
                                                 
4 The level of polarisation of emissions is considerably lower in the European Union than in the world as a whole (Duro 
and Padilla, 2008) regardless of the number of groups analysed and the value of the parameters. 
 9
 Table 1. Two-group inter-country polarisation of CO2 emissions per capita in the 
European Union, 1990–2007 
  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6 
 ER  EGR ER  EGR ER  EGR 
1990 0.1296 0.0402 0.0894 0.1053 0.0402 0.0651 0.0855 0.0402 0.0453
1991 0.1293 0.0329 0.0965    0.1050 0.0329 0.0722     0.0853 0.0329 0.0525
1992    0.1247     0.0296  0.0951    0.1013    0.0296 0.0717    0.0823     0.0296  0.0527
1993 0.1298 0.0317 0.0981 0.1054 0.0317 0.0737 0.0857 0.0317 0.0539
1994 0.1289 0.0323 0.0966 0.1048 0.0323 0.0725 0.0851 0.0323 0.0528
1995 0.1181 0.0325 0.0856 0.0960 0.0325 0.0634 0.0780 0.0325 0.0455
1996 0.1251 0.0339 0.0912 0.1017 0.0339 0.0678 0.0826 0.0339 0.0487
1997 0.1165 0.0339 0.0827 0.0947 0.0339 0.0608 0.0769 0.0339 0.0431
1998 0.1075 0.0365 0.0710 0.0873 0.0365 0.0509 0.0710 0.0365 0.0345
1999 0.1019 0.0374 0.0645 0.0828 0.0374 0.0454 0.0673 0.0374 0.0299
2000 0.1042 0.0381 0.0661 0.0850 0.0381 0.0469 0.0695 0.0381 0.0314
2001 0.1064 0.0362 0.0702 0.0867 0.0362 0.0505 0.0707 0.0362 0.0345
2002 0.1019 0.0364 0.0655 0.0830 0.0364 0.0466 0.0677 0.0364 0.0313
2003 0.1027 0.0374 0.0653 0.0836 0.0374 0.0462 0.0682 0.0374 0.0308
2004 0.1001 0.0379 0.0622 0.0815 0.0379 0.0436 0.0665 0.0379 0.0286
2005 0.0915 0.0364 0.0551 0.0745 0.0364 0.0381 0.0608 0.0364 0.0244
2006 0.0963 0.0387 0.0576 0.0784 0.0387 0.0397 0.0640 0.0387 0.0253
2007 0.0954 0.0398 0.0557 0.0775 0.0398 0.0377 0.0630 0.0398 0.0232
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
 
Table 2. Two-group case: description of groups 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 
 p1 e1/e P2 e2/e 
1990 0.49 0.73 0.51 1.25 
1991 0.50 0.74 0.50 1.26 
1992 0.51 0.76 0.49 1.25 
1993 0.51 0.75 0.49 1.26 
1994 0.52 0.75 0.48 1.27 
1995 0.52 0.77 0.48 1.25 
1996 0.52 0.76 0.48 1.26 
1997 0.52 0.78 0.48 1.24 
1998 0.52 0.79 0.48 1.22 
1999 0.52 0.80 0.48 1.21 
2000 0.57 0.82 0.43 1.25 
2001 0.56 0.81 0.44 1.24 
2002 0.56 0.82 0.44 1.23 
2003 0.56 0.82 0.44 1.23 
2004 0.56 0.82 0.44 1.23 
2005 0.56 0.84 0.44 1.21 
2006 0.56 0.83 0.44 1.22 
2007 0.48 0.80 0.52 1.19 
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Table 3. Three-group inter-country polarisation of CO2 emissions per capita in the 
European Union, 1990–2007 
 
  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6 
 ER  EGR ER  EGR ER  EGR 
1990 0.1065 0.0188 0.0877 0.0796 0.0188 0.0608 0.0600 0.0188 0.0412
1991 0.1052 0.0153 0.0899 0.0788 0.0153 0.0635 0.0595 0.0153 0.0442
1992 0.1023 0.0150 0.0873 0.0775 0.0150 0.0626 0.0594 0.0150 0.0444
1993 0.1048 0.0163 0.0884 0.0787 0.0163 0.0624 0.0596 0.0163 0.0433
1994 0.1043 0.0165 0.0878 0.0783 0.0165 0.0619 0.0593 0.0165 0.0428
1995 0.0909 0.0138 0.0770 0.0655 0.0138 0.0517 0.0473 0.0138 0.0335
1996 0.0939 0.0166 0.0773 0.0676 0.0166 0.0510 0.0487 0.0166 0.0321
1997 0.0899 0.0141 0.0758 0.0646 0.0141 0.0506 0.0465 0.0141 0.0324
1998 0.0856 0.0142 0.0714 0.0615 0.0142 0.0473 0.0443 0.0142 0.0301
1999 0.0815 0.0159 0.0656 0.0586 0.0159 0.0427 0.0422 0.0159 0.0263
2000 0.0853 0.0165 0.0688 0.0621 0.0165 0.0456 0.0453 0.0165 0.0288
2001 0.0859 0.0163 0.0697 0.0625 0.0163 0.0463 0.0456 0.0163 0.0294
2002 0.0810 0.0157 0.0653 0.0588 0.0157 0.0432 0.0430 0.0157 0.0273
2003 0.0814 0.0165 0.0649 0.0590 0.0165 0.0425 0.0429 0.0165 0.0264
2004 0.0811 0.0148 0.0663 0.0588 0.0148 0.0439 0.0428 0.0148 0.0280
2005 0.0748 0.0142 0.0607 0.0542 0.0142 0.0400 0.0394 0.0142 0.0252
2006 0.0796 0.0142 0.0654 0.0577 0.0142 0.0435 0.0421 0.0142 0.0279
2007 0.0791 0.0152 0.0639 0.0574 0.0152 0.0422 0.0418 0.0152 0.0267
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
 
 
Table 4. Three-group case: description of groups 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 p1 e1/e p2 e2/e p3 e3/e 
1990 0.49 0.73 0.29 1.11 0.23 1.44 
1991 0.49 0.74 0.25 1.10 0.27 1.39 
1992 0.51 0.76 0.22 1.12 0.27 1.36 
1993 0.49 0.74 0.24 1.11 0.27 1.38 
1994 0.49 0.74 0.24 1.10 0.27 1.38 
1995 0.37 0.72 0.36 1.02 0.27 1.36 
1996 0.35 0.70 0.38 1.01 0.27 1.38 
1997 0.35 0.71 0.38 1.01 0.28 1.35 
1998 0.35 0.73 0.38 1.00 0.28 1.34 
1999 0.35 0.73 0.38 1.01 0.28 1.31 
2000 0.26 0.69 0.33 0.93 0.40 1.26 
2001 0.26 0.69 0.34 0.92 0.40 1.26 
2002 0.26 0.69 0.46 0.98 0.28 1.31 
2003 0.27 0.70 0.45 0.99 0.28 1.32 
2004 0.27 0.69 0.45 1.00 0.28 1.31 
2005 0.27 0.70 0.44 1.01 0.28 1.27 
2006 0.27 0.69 0.45 1.01 0.28 1.29 
2007 0.27 0.69 0.45 1.01 0.28 1.29 
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
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Table 5. Four-group inter-country polarisation of CO2 emissions per capita in the 
European Union, 1991–2007 
 
  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6 
 ER  EGR ER  EGR ER  EGR 
1990 0.0796 0.0094 0.0702 0.0525 0.0094 0.0431 0.0347 0.0094 0.0253 
1991 0.0785 0.0079 0.0706 0.0523 0.0079 0.0444 0.0349 0.0079 0.0270 
1992 0.0758 0.0068 0.0690 0.0507 0.0068 0.0440 0.0341 0.0068 0.0273 
1993 0.0814 0.0062 0.0751 0.0547 0.0062 0.0485 0.0369 0.0062 0.0306 
1994 0.0810 0.0065 0.0745 0.0544 0.0065 0.0479 0.0367 0.0065 0.0302 
1995 0.0759 0.0062 0.0697 0.0510 0.0062 0.0449 0.0344 0.0062 0.0282 
1996 0.0797 0.0071 0.0726 0.0536 0.0071 0.0465 0.0361 0.0071 0.0290 
1997 0.0765 0.0072 0.0692 0.0518 0.0072 0.0446 0.0352 0.0072 0.0280 
1998 0.0694 0.0090 0.0604 0.0465 0.0090 0.0375 0.0312 0.0090 0.0222 
1999 0.0665 0.0093 0.0572 0.0442 0.0093 0.0350 0.0295 0.0093 0.0202 
2000 0.0696 0.0094 0.0603 0.0469 0.0094 0.0375 0.0316 0.0094 0.0223 
2001 0.0693 0.0088 0.0605 0.0464 0.0088 0.0376 0.0311 0.0088 0.0223 
2002 0.0676 0.0077 0.0600 0.0453 0.0077 0.0376 0.0304 0.0077 0.0227 
2003 0.0688 0.0087 0.0601 0.0463 0.0087 0.0376 0.0312 0.0087 0.0225 
2004 0.0675 0.0076 0.0599 0.0452 0.0076 0.0376 0.0303 0.0076 0.0227 
2005 0.0624 0.0073 0.0551 0.0418 0.0073 0.0345 0.0280 0.0073 0.0207 
2006 0.0665 0.0078 0.0586 0.0447 0.0078 0.0368 0.0301 0.0078 0.0222 
2007 0.0635 0.0088 0.0547 0.0419 0.0088 0.0331 0.0277 0.0088 0.0189 
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
 
 
Note that the various endogenous groupings have high explanatory capacity. In 
the two-group case, inter-group differences account for 70% of the overall 
international inequalities; this explanatory capacity reaches 89% in the three-
group case and 94% in the four-group case. The limited increase in explanatory 
capacity as the number of groups increases beyond three leads us, intuitively, 
to prefer the three-group simplification. In any event, as Esteban et al. (2007) 
noted, the value of the generalised polarisation itself provides clues as to the 
most appropriate grouping. The analysis clearly indicates that the two- and 
three-group cases are superior to the four-group case, but does not 
conclusively point to a general preference between the two- and three-group 
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cases. Thus, with the exception of the past few years, the two-group 
simplification seems to be the most appropriate option; however, in the interest 
of maintaining explanatory capacity, the three-group option is the preferred form 
of analysis for the most recent years of the study period.  
 
Table 6. International inequality (Gini) explained by simplified distributions, 
1990–2007 
 Two 
groups 
Three 
groups 
Four 
groups 
1990 76.3% 
 
88.9% 
 
94.5% 
 
1991 79.7% 
 
90.6% 
 
95.2% 
 
1992 80.8% 
 
90.3% 
 
95.6% 
 
1993 80.4% 
 
89.9% 
 
96.2% 
 
1994 80.0% 
 
89.8% 
 
96.0% 
 
1995 78.4% 
 
90.8% 
 
95.9% 
 
1996 78.7% 
 
89.6% 
 
95.5% 
 
1997 77.5% 
  
90.6% 
 
95.2% 
 
1998 74.7% 
  
90.1% 
 
93.8% 
 
1999 73.2% 
  
88.6% 
 
93.4% 
 
2000 73.2% 
  
88.4% 
 
93.4% 
 
2001 74.6% 
  
88.6% 
 
93.8% 
 
2002 73.7% 
 
88.7% 
 
94.4% 
 
2003 73.3% 
 
88.2% 
 
93.8% 
 
2004 72.5% 
 
89.2% 
 
94.5% 
 
2005 71.5% 
 
88.9% 
 
94.3% 
 
2006 71.3% 
 
89.5% 
 
94.2% 
 
2007 70.6% 
 
88.8% 
 
93.5% 
 
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a).  
 
An analysis of the evolution of inequality—a distribution concept that is, as 
mentioned above, fundamentally different from polarisation—reveals, in the 
same period, a noticeable downward trend that is nonetheless generally less 
intense and more monotonic than the trend revealed by the polarisation 
measures. The Gini coefficient decreases by 20% over the course of the study 
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period.5 In any event, this evolution reinforces the “goodness” of the 
distributional pattern followed by the emissions of the various EU countries. 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of cross-country European Union endogenous 
polarisation and comparison with inequality, 1990–2007 
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Note: 1990 = 100. EGRs are based on  = 1 and  = 1.3. 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a).  
 
 
3.2. Exogenous groups 
 
As a complement to our analysis of endogenous groups, it is of interest to 
analyse the polarisation found using ex-ante groups of countries. We selected 
geographical location as a reasonable criterion for the grouping. Specifically, we 
chose an apparently reasonable three-group structure that provides better 
results than other exogenous segmentation options. We named the groups 
Europe North (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom), Europe East 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and Europe South (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
Malta, Portugal and Spain). Although this proposal is based on geographical, 
                                                 
5 Although the overall pattern is analogously downward, significant disparities emerge between the evolution of 
inequality and that of polarisation. For example, if we compare the evolution of the three-group EGR index with 
parameters β = 1 and α = 1.3 to the Gini coefficient, we see that the former rose by 3% while the second dropped by 
9.1% between 1990 and 1992. Another example of this sort of discrepancy occurred between 1992 and 1996, when the 
EGR index decreased by a significant 18.5% and the Gini coefficient, in contrast, increased by 3.1%.  
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political and economic criteria rather than on an optimisation process as in the 
previous section, we find a degree of similarity between this analysis and that of 
the endogenous groups; note, for example, the degree of agreement with the 
other grouping for the year 2007.6 
For this analysis, we used the Z-K index, which has the advantage of being 
decomposable, a characteristic which enables us to investigate which sources 
explain the overall polarisation results. Table 7 shows the results of the Z-K 
index for the aforementioned groups of EU countries. As in the endogenous 
polarisation analysis, we find a clear overall decrease over the course of the 
study period: the value of the polarisation measure dropped from 0.50 in 1990 
to 0.12 in 2007. This amounts to a 77% decrease, which is larger than the 
reduction calculated for the endogenous indices mentioned above. An analysis 
of the group inequality components that make up the index indicates that the 
bulk of this decrease can be attributed to the behaviour of the between-group 
component, which decreased by 79% during the study period, while the 9% 
decrease in within-group inequality helped to increase polarisation (by making 
the various groups somewhat more internally homogeneous). This result is in 
line with our intuitive interpretation of the endogenous polarisation analysis. 
Also, the rather low level reached by the between-group component indicates 
that any significant future reductions in polarisation would have to be based on 
an increase in the within-group component (in other words, a lower level of 
internal cohesion would prevent groups from forming around different interests).  
 
                                                 
6 Sweden and France are two countries that do not fit this trend. Despite belonging to Europe 
North and having high per capita incomes, these two countries have lower emission levels due 
to the different range of energy sources they use, including nuclear power and, in the case of 
Sweden, renewable energy sources.  
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Table 7. Exogenous polarisation in the European Union, 1990–2007 
 
 Between 
inequality 
Within 
inequality 
Z-K index 
1990 0.0156 0.0311 0.5026 
1991 0.0153 0.0276 0.5540 
1992 0.0121 0.0262 0.4624 
1993 0.0126 0.0298 0.4250 
1994 0.0122 0.0297 0.4119 
1995 0.0090 0.0276 0.3280 
1996 0.0122 0.0284 0.4311 
1997 0.0085 0.0281 0.3028 
1998 0.0091 0.0253 0.3604 
1999 0.0083 0.0266 0.3104 
2000 0.0079 0.0282 0.2788 
2001 0.0082 0.0267 0.3077 
2002 0.0075 0.0258 0.2902 
2003 0.0069 0.0268 0.2572 
2004 0.0062 0.0272 0.2280 
2005 0.0047 0.0246 0.1914 
2006 0.0044 0.0271 0.1633 
2007 0.0033 0.0284 0.1162 
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a). 
Note: The groups are Europe North, Europe South and Europe East. 
 
 
Given the importance of the evolution of the between-group component in 
explaining the reduction in exogenous polarisation, it is of interest to investigate 
the factors behind this evolution. The Kaya identity (1989) enables us to 
decompose emissions per capita into three factors: carbon emissions per unit of 
energy consumed, energy intensity, and GDP per capita. The methodology 
proposed by Duro and Padilla (2006) makes it possible to decompose the value 
of the Theil index of inequality in emissions per capita into the inequality 
attributable to the three Kaya factors plus two interaction terms. We applied this 
methodology to decompose the between-group inequality. 
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The decomposition results shown in Table A.2 of the Appendix indicate that the 
partial contribution of energy intensity played an important role in the 
considerable decrease in inequality (81%). Nevertheless, the great importance 
of the interaction factors obliges us to consider their evolution as well, in order 
to account for the overall effect on the evolution of the components associated 
with the different Kaya factors. If we distribute the interaction components 
among the various factors that generate them following the criterion of 
Shorrocks (jointly generated, equally distributed), we obtain the results shown in 
Table 8. The lower contribution to inequality of energy intensity—which no 
longer plays anything like a leading role—largely explains the evolution of the 
inequalities and offsets the greater contribution associated with the affluence 
factor.7 The negative component can be explained by the fact that the region 
with the greatest energy intensity tends to be the one with the lowest GDP per 
capita (note the significantly negative interaction factor in Table A.2), which 
results in these two inequalities cancelling one another out and, in the case of 
energy intensity, leading to a negative net contribution.  
 
 
 
Table 8. Decomposition of between-group inequality component by 
applying Shorrocks’s rule, 1990–2007 
 
 
 
 Between-group 
inequality CO2/PE PE/GDP GDP/P 
1990 0.0156 -0.0026 0.0150 0.0031
  (-16.3%) (96.3%) (20.0%)
1995 0.0090 -0.0055 -0.0019 0.0163
  (-60.6%) (-20.8%) (181.4%)
2000 0.0079 -0.0066 -0.0118 0.0261
  (-85.7%) (-153.2%) (339.0%)
2005 0.0047 -0.0049 -0.0097 0.0193
  (-104.3%) (-206.4%) (410.6%)
2007 0.0033 -0.0042 -0.0082 0.0157
  (-125.8%) (-249.2%) (475.0%)
% change -78.8% 62.8% -154.7% 401.6% 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c). 
Note: The percentage with respect to between-group inequality is shown in brackets.  
                                                 
7 See Padilla and Duro (2011) for a more detailed analysis of the decomposition of inequality at the EU level into the 
various Kaya factors. 
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 Table 9. Characteristics of exogenous groups, 1990–2007 
 
 Carbon 
index 
(CO2/PE) 
(relative) 
Energy 
intensity 
(PE/GDP) 
(relative) 
Affluence 
(GDP/P) 
(relative) 
Emissions 
(relative) 
pi 
1990      
North 0.93 0.99 1.20 1.11 52.9% 
South 1.05 0.66 1.04 0.72 24.7% 
East 1.17 1.87 0.48 1.06 22.4% 
2000      
North 0.92 1.00 1.20 1.11 53.8% 
South 1.09 0.80 1.04 0.91 24.7% 
East 1.20 1.53 0.45 0.83 21.5% 
2007      
North 0.92 0.99 1.18 1.07 53.8% 
South 1.11 0.86 0.99 0.94 25.6% 
East 1.17 1.36 0.56 0.89 20.6% 
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c). 
Note: The value 1 corresponds to the world average for each year and factor. 
 
 
Let us now examine the component associated with the energy intensity factor. 
The observed pattern can be explained by a relative reduction in energy 
intensity in Europe East in particular, paired with a relative increase for Europe 
South. (This is in the context of reduced energy intensity for Europe as a whole: 
from 1990 to 2007, Europe went from 191 to 142 tonnes of oil equivalent per 
US$1 million for the year 2000 at purchasing power parity.)8 
 
The within-group component is less relevant to explaining the evolution of 
polarisation in the European Union. This polarisation—which, as mentioned 
above, has tended to increase—can essentially be attributed to the smaller 
contribution of GDP per capita to within-group inequality. The groups are 
                                                 
8 In the Europe East zone, energy intensity dropped from 359 to 193 over the same period. 
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therefore somewhat more homogeneous as a result of this factor’s smaller 
contribution to within-group inequality.  
 
 
Table 10. Decomposition of within-group inequality component by Kaya 
factors 
 
 Within-group 
inequality CO2/PE PE/GDP GDP/P 
1990 0.0311 0.0196 0.0034 0.0081 
  (63.1%) (10.9%) (26.0%) 
1995 0.0276 0.0192 0.0018 0.0067 
  (69.4%) (6.4%) (24.2%) 
2000 0.0282 0.0176 0.0027 0.0079 
  (62.6%) (9.4%) (27.9%) 
2005 0.0246 0.0162 0.0032 0.0052 
  (65.9%) (13.0%) (21.1%) 
2007 0.0284 0.0187 0.0043 0.0053 
 (65.9%) (15.3%) (18.8%) 
% change -8.7% -4.6% 28.1% -34.1% 
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c). 
Note: The percentage with respect to within-group inequality is shown in brackets.  
 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
 
In this study, we have made the first analysis of the polarisation of CO2 
emissions per capita for the countries of the European Union from 1990 to 
2007. The study offers an in-depth examination of the measurement of a 
distributional characteristic closely related to the likelihood of reaching 
agreements on mitigation policy, a crucial aspect in the current context of EU 
policies and strategies to mitigate climate change. 
 
In this analysis, we used the EGR indices (Esteban et al., 2007), which are 
designed for analysing polarisation in general (i.e. regardless of the number of 
groups) and take into account the error committed in the formation of groups. 
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We also used the Z-K polarisation index (Zhang and Kanbur, 2001), which 
allows the analysis of polarisation with exogenous groups (in our case, three 
regional groups: Europe North, Europe South and Europe East) and the 
decomposition of the results by explanatory factors.  
 
Our findings revealed a considerable non-linear decrease in polarisation 
concentrated between the mid-1990s and the present day. Most of this 
decrease can be attributed to the convergence of the various groups in terms of 
emissions per capita (i.e. antagonism among the groups has decreased). In the 
endogenous analysis, segmentation of the countries into two or three poles was 
found to be very appropriate, with a low level of information loss associated with 
the grouping. In the analysis of the polarisation with exogenous groups—which 
showed an evolution qualitatively similar to that of the polarisation with 
endogenous groups—we confirmed that the decrease in polarisation can be 
attributed to the lower degree of antagonism between the groups, which can 
largely be explained by the lower contribution of the energy intensity factor. 
Indeed, energy intensity goes from being the main factor explaining the 
divergence among the groups to playing a role in reducing this divergence, a 
phenomenon explained by the strong negative between-group correlation 
between energy intensity and affluence. The internal coherence of the groups 
increased slightly, but this effect was easily offset by the decreased antagonism 
among the groups.  
 
In short, we found that the overall reduction in emissions per capita in the 
European Union has coincided with a considerable reduction both in the 
polarisation of the distribution and in inequality. The overall evolution has thus 
been marked by a process of convergence among the countries, which tends to 
reduce tension in negotiations and increase the likelihood of reaching 
agreements on common mitigation policies at the EU level. Nevertheless, 
despite the reduced level of divergence in the distribution, the chances of 
reaching such an agreement are also heavily influenced by the degree of 
overall sacrifice required. If drastic levels of greenhouse-gas reduction are 
required—greater than 50% or 80%, as is recommended to help stabilise 
atmospheric gases at levels considered to be reasonable—then the persistence 
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and evolution of distributional differences will continue to be highly relevant 
factors in discussions about mitigation agreements.  
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Appendix .  
 
Table A.1. Groups of countries determined endogenously by polarisation 
analysis 
 
 Two groups Three groups Four groups 
1990 Portugal 
Spain 
France 
Sweden 
Malta 
Hungary 
Slovenia 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Latvia 
Italy 
Romania 
Austria 
Bulgaria 
Ireland 
Lithuania 
Poland 
United 
Kingdom 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Slovakia 
Belgium 
Finland 
Germany 
Czech 
Republic 
Estonia 
Luxembourg 
Portugal 
Spain 
France 
Sweden 
Malta 
Hungary 
Slovenia 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Latvia 
Italy 
Romania 
Austria 
Bulgaria 
Ireland 
Lithuania 
Poland 
United 
Kingdom 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Slovakia 
Belgium 
Finland 
Germany 
Czech 
Republic 
Estonia 
Luxembourg 
Portugal 
Spain 
France 
Sweden 
Malta 
Hungary 
Slovenia 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Latvia 
Italy 
Romania 
Austria 
Bulgaria 
Ireland 
Lithuania 
Poland 
United 
Kingdom 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Slovakia 
Belgium 
Finland 
Germany 
Czech 
Republic 
Estonia 
Luxembourg 
2000 Latvia 
Lithuania 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
Malta 
Portugal 
Sweden 
France 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Italy 
Poland 
Austria 
Greece 
United 
Kingdom 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Germany 
Finland 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Czech 
Republic 
Luxembourg 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
Malta 
Portugal 
Sweden 
France 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Italy 
Poland 
Austria 
Greece 
United 
Kingdom 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Germany 
Finland 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Czech 
Republic 
Luxembourg 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
Malta 
Portugal 
Sweden 
France 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Italy 
Poland 
Austria 
Greece 
United 
Kingdom 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Germany 
Finland 
Estonia 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Czech 
Republic 
Luxembourg 
2007 Latvia 
Romania 
Lithuania 
Sweden 
Portugal 
Hungary 
France 
Bulgaria 
Malta 
Slovakia 
Italy 
Spain 
Slovenia 
Poland 
Austria 
United 
Kingdom 
Greece 
Denmark 
Cyprus 
Germany 
Belgium 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Czech 
Republic 
Finland 
Estonia 
Luxembourg 
Latvia 
Romania 
Lithuania 
Sweden 
Portugal 
Hungary 
France 
Bulgaria 
Malta 
Slovakia 
Italy 
Spain 
Slovenia 
Poland 
Austria 
United 
Kingdom 
Greece 
Denmark 
Cyprus 
Germany 
Belgium 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Czech 
Republic 
Finland 
Estonia 
Luxembourg 
Latvia 
Romania 
Lithuania 
Sweden 
Portugal 
Hungary 
France 
Bulgaria 
Malta 
Slovakia 
Italy 
Spain 
Slovenia 
Poland 
Austria 
United 
Kingdom 
Greece 
Denmark 
Cyprus 
Germany 
Belgium 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Czech 
Republic 
Finland 
Estonia 
Luxembourg 
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Table A.2 Decomposition of between-group inequality component, 1990–
2007 
 
 
 Between-group 
inequality CO2/EP EP/GDP GDP/P Corra.by Corrb.y 
1990 0.0156 0.0045 0.0688 0.0569 -0.0141 -0.1005 
  (28.8%) (441.0%) (364.7%) (-90.4%) (-644.2%)
1995 0.0090 0.0054 0.0508 0.0690 -0.0217 -0.0945 
  (60.0%) (564.4%) (766.7%) (-241.1%) (-1050.0%)
2000 0.0079 0.0062 0.0259 0.0638 -0.0256 -0.0626 
  (80.5%) (336.4%) (828.6%) (-332.5%) (-813.0%)
2005 0.0047 0.0060 0.0155 0.0445 -0.0218 -0.0395 
  (127.7%) (329.8%) (946.8%) (-463.8%) (-840.4%)
2007 0.0033 0.0058 0.0129 0.0368 -0.0199 -0.0323 
  (175.8%) (390.9%) (1115.2%) (-603.0%) (-978.8%)
% change -78.8% 28. 9% -81.3% -35.3 41.1 -67.9 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c). 
Note: The percentage with respect to between-group inequality is shown in brackets. 
 
 
Table A.3 Decomposition of within-group inequality component by Kaya 
factors 
 Within-group 
inequality CO2/EP EP/GDP GDP/P Corra,by Corrb,y 
1990 0.0311 0.0203 0.0084 0.0131 -0.0015 -0.0093 
  (65.5%) (27.1%) (42.3%) (-4.8%) (-30.0%) 
1995 0.0276 0.0207 0.0072 0.0121 -0.0031 -0.0093 
  (75.0%) (26.1%) (43.8%) (-11.2%) (-33.7%) 
2000 0.0282 0.0197 0.0087 0.0139 -0.0042 -0.0100 
  (70.1%) (31.0%) (49.5%) (-14.9%) (-35.6%) 
2005 0.0246 0.0215 0.0085 0.0105 -0.0106 -0.0053 
  (87.4%) (34.6%) (42.7%) (-43.1%) (-21.5%) 
2007 0.0284 0.0232 0.0090 0.0100 -0.0091 -0.0048 
  (82.0%) (31.8%) (35.3%) (-32.2%) (-17.0%) 
% change -8.7% 14.3% 7.1% -23.7% 506.7% -48.4% 
 
Source: Drawn up by the authors using International Energy Agency data (IEA, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c). 
Note: The percentage with respect to within-group inequality is shown in brackets. 
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